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Azerbaijan’s Foreign policy and Challenges
for Energy Security
pinar Ipek
This article examines Azerbaijan’s foreign policy by demonstrating the interplay 
between the oil-led development process and early post-independence regional 
conflicts that enforced a Western orientation in the country’s foreign policy. It is 
argued that geopolitics continue to prevail in the strategic goals of Azerbaijan. 
However, the new challenges in the emerging framework of energy security, which 
extends beyond the revitalized geopolitical rivalries and preeminent concern over 
securing energy supplies, put Azerbaijan’s foreign policy at a crossroads and re-
quire a new trans-Atlantic partnership to promote human security and to manage 
the risk entailed in the unpredictable policy environments of the Caspian region.
Azerbaijan is of crucial importance to the world energy market. The proven and poten-
tial reserves in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea are expected to diversify, secure, 
and stabilize world energy supplies, as North Sea resources did in the past. However, 
the land-locked energy resources in the Caspian region pose additional challenges to the 
transport of oil and gas resources, particularly to the European energy markets. Today, 
long-distance transnational pipelines have grown increasingly central in efforts to ensure 
energy security, in large part because they provide an alternative to a number of vulner-
able maritime chokepoints.1 Thus, a broadened understanding of energy security is im-
perative not only to understand the new challenges of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy but also 
to cope with any potential instability or geopolitical rivalries in the Caspian region.
This article examines Azerbaijan’s foreign policy using the oil-led development 
process and the country’s relations with multinational oil companies as a framework 
for analysis and addresses the challenges for energy security in the Caspian. The recent 
war between Russia and georgia and the ongoing Karabakh conflict between Azerbai-
jan and Armenia not only renewed awareness of geopolitical rivalries, but also further 
multiplied the nodes of vulnerability along the energy infrastructure and cross-border 
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tion project) program designed to strengthen democracy through education in the Central Asian region. Her 
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thank the graduate School of public and International Affairs, University of pittsburgh for its research sup-
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1. About two-thirds of the world’s crude oil and refined products travel by tanker. Along the way, 
tankers pass through “chokepoints” or narrow channels. These include the Strait of Hormuz (Oman/
Iran, connects the persian gulf with the gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea), Bab al-Mandab (Yemen/
Eritrea, connects the Red Sea with the gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea), Bosphorus and the Dar-
danelles Straits (Turkey, connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea), Suez (Egypt, connects 
the Red Sea and gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea), Malacca (Malaysia/Singapore, connects 
the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the pacific Ocean), and the panama Canal (panama, 
connects the pacific Ocean with the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean).
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pipelines in the world energy market. Although there was no immediate attack on, or 
threat to, the oil and gas pipelines bypassing Russia through the Caucasus region and 
reaching the Mediterranean in Turkey (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline), Russia clear-
ly expressed itself as a regional power by not allowing any changes in the status quo of 
the region or any individual attempts to solve “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasus.
The first section of this article demonstrates how the oil-led development process 
and Azerbaijan’s relations with multinational oil companies have enforced the coun-
try’s Western-oriented foreign policy. The second section examines the linkages be-
tween Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and the challenges for energy security in the Caspian 
region. In the third section, it is concluded that geopolitics has prevailed in Azerbaijan’s 
foreign policy; however, a new trans-Atlantic partnership is required to meet the new 
challenges of energy security in the Caspian region.
THE rolE of oIl In AzErbAIjAn’S WESTErn-orIEnTEd 
forEIgn PolICy
Security threats in the early years of Azerbaijan’s independence were critical in 
setting the course of the country’s foreign policy, which has been largely driven by 
the economic and political preferences toward Azerbaijan’s prioritizing relations with 
multinational oil companies and utilizing an oil-led development process. Azerbaijan’s 
economy was in severe crisis after the collapse of the central economic system of the 
former Soviet Union. Foreign direct investment in the oil and gas sectors was crucial to 
boost the country’s economic recovery. As part of the collapsed Soviet system, Azer-
baijan’s economic activities had been focused on the extraction and production of raw 
materials. The experience of Azerbaijan, however, was somewhat different from those 
of other former Soviet republics due to its geographic location and cultural context. 
Azerbaijan has a Turkish Muslim population, and is located between powerful neigh-
bors — Iran and Russia. In fact, several regional conflicts, which took place shortly 
after Azerbaijan’s independence, emphasized the importance of economic recovery for 
its national security. Thus, Azerbaijan had to secure its political independence and eco-
nomic development amid complex geopolitics that reflected the conflicting interests of 
different stakeholders, while finalizing its oil and gas projects, particularly for pipeline 
routes. These stakeholders included multinational oil companies, Azerbaijan’s neigh-
bors (including Iran, Russia, and georgia), and Turkey and the United States. 
Within this framework, two major regional conflicts were influential in setting 
the strategic goals for Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in order to maximize its national 
security: 1) the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and 2) the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea. An examination of events in these conflicts is given to demonstrate the interplay 
between the interests and foreign policy concerns of Azerbaijan and its relations with 
oil companies that enforced a Western orientation in its foreign policy.
The ArmeniAn-AzerbAijAni ConfliCT: nATionAl SeCuriTy, PoliTiCAl leAderShiP, 
And The oil CArd
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the Karabakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) has 
been an important factor in setting the strategic goals for Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. 
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Since its independence, the successive presidents of Azerbaijan have faced the security 
dilemma of preserving the stability of their regimes through the prism of the Karabakh 
problem. First, the Karabakh conflict was a threat to internal stability since the strong 
pressure of opposition groups highly politicized the Karabakh issue, which in turn caused 
consecutive changes in political leadership. For example, in the short period between 
1991 and 1993, Azerbaijan had three presidents, who either had to resign following the 
atrocities against civilians in the Khodjaly massacre in the Karabakh region in 1992 or 
left the presidency because of an insurgency following defeats against Armenian forces 
in Karabakh in the winter of 1992. Thus, the first president of independent Azerbai-
jan, Ayaz Mutalibov, had to resign in March 1992 following public protests against the 
Khodjaly massacre in February, while Abulfez Elchibey was elected in June 1992 after 
the interim presidency of Yakub Mamedov. However, president Elchibey had to leave 
Baku on June 21, 1993 following an anti-government insurgency that started on June 4 
and resulted in Haydar Aliyev’s taking power and becoming president on June 25.
Second, the Karabakh conflict remained critical in determining priorities in Azer-
baijan’s foreign policy as well as setting a course with different regional powers in the 
short period between 1991 and 1993. Third, Azerbaijan needed to begin oil exports 
to increase its revenues. A financially stronger Azerbaijan could have a modern army, 
which in turn would enable stronger leverage against Russia and Armenia. However, 
exporting oil from the landlocked Caspian region through Russia would increase Rus-
sia’s leverage over Azerbaijan. 
The Karabakh conflict had its roots during the Soviet period, in which Moscow 
initially opposed Armenian demands concerning the region, and considered them a 
threat to the fragile regional ethnic map in the Caucasus.2 However, Armenian claims 
in 1988 led thousands of people to fight over the Karabakh, jeopardizing Azerbaijan’s 
territorial unity. As a reaction to Armenian demands for Karabakh’s independence, an-
ti-Armenian riots occurred in Sumgait, Azerbaijan in 1988. Following the heightened 
ethnic tension, there were Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes in Baku in January 1990.3 
In response, president Mikhail gorbachev of the Soviet Union sent Russian troops to 
Baku in January 1990. The entrance of the Russian troops into Baku resulted in the 
death of many civilians. Thus, this event, known as “Black January,” was the turning 
point in Azerbaijan’s history. It facilitated pro-independence and anti-Russian feelings 
among Azeris and had a critical impact on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy orientation as 
well as its domestic politics.4
The Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is one of the most dra-
matic human tragedies in the post-Soviet era in the Caucasus. The total number of 
refugees and internally displaced people from the occupied territories in Karabakh and 
the seven districts outside the region5 is 1,010,000, while there were 20,000 casualties, 
2. Vicken Cheterian, “Dialectics of Ethnic Conflicts and Oil projects in the Caucasus,” program 
for Strategic and International Security Studies, Occasional paper Number 1, 1997, p. 24.
3. Tamara Dragadze, “Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijanis,” in graham Smith, ed., The nationalities 
Question in the Post Soviet States (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 269-290.
4. Ceylan Tokluoglu, “Definitions of National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnicity in post-Soviet 
Azerbaijan in the 1990s,” Ethnic and racial Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2005), p. 727.
5. Lachin, Kalbajar, Aghdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, gubadly, and Zangilan.
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50,000 people disabled, and 4,866 people missing.6 Furthermore, the 1992 Khodjaly 
massacre, which has been portrayed by Azerbaijani officials as the ethnic cleansing of 
the occupied territories, provoked anger and sorrow among all Azeris and is a major 
source of distrust with regards to Armenia. During the height of clashes in the Kara-
bakh region, Khodjaly’s civilians could not flee and were brutally attacked by Arme-
nian armed forces over the night of February 25-26, 1992. As a result, 613 people were 
killed, including 106 women, 63 children, and 70 elderly people; 1,275 people were 
taken hostage, and the fate of 150 people remains unknown.7
The demise of the Soviet Union brought a radical change in the balance of power 
in the Karabakh conflict.8 The Soviet Army, which between 1988-1991 had buffered 
the increasing violence between Armenian and Azerbaijani fighters, withdrew between 
November 1991 and February 1992.9 Thus, the Azeris and Armenians were left alone, 
which led to a full-scale war in the region. Ayaz Mutalibov, who had been the last 
president of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, became the first president of 
the independent Republic of Azerbaijan when Azerbaijan declared its independence 
on October 18, 1991. president Mutalibov paid more attention to strategic cooperation 
with Iran and Russia during his administration. However, the military defeats on the 
Karabakh front destabilized his regime. In March 1992, after the Khodjaly massacre, 
public resentment turned into a mass protest in Baku against his presidency. Mutalibov 
accused Azerbaijani opposition groups of having exaggerated the Khodjaly massacre in 
order to bring him down. Mutalibov’s declaration increased public anger against him, 
as well as accusations about Russian influence on his presidency. Finally, Mutalibov 
was forced to step down in March 1992.10 Yakub Mamedov took over as interim presi-
dent, but instability and a power struggle continued in Baku. A presidential election 
was held in June 1992. The Azerbaijan popular Front leader, Abulfez Elchibey, won 
and stabilized the presidency. 
During Elchibey’s administration, Russian demands for the return of its military 
bases and control over Azerbaijan’s energy exports in return for military assistance to 
Azerbaijan led his administration to follow a clear anti-Russian strategy that reflected 
pan-Turkism as the ideology of his Azerbaijan popular Front.11 The Russian demands 
were unacceptable for the sovereignty of independent Azerbaijan.12 Thus, Russia sup-
ported the Armenian side and the shift in the balance of power to Armenian forces led to 
6. Haydar Aliyev Foundation, Consequences of Armenian Aggression against Azerbaijan, in the 
series of True facts about garabagh (Baku: Haydar Aliyev Foundation, 2005), pp. 1-2.
7. Haydar Aliyev Foundation, The Khodjaly genocide, in the series of True facts about garabagh 
(Baku: Haydar Aliyev Foundation, 2005), pp. 7-8.
8. Emmanuel Karagiannis, Energy and Security in the Caucasus (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
pp. 40-41.
9. It was reported that Russian forces began to withdraw from the Karabakh enclave in November 
1991, except for the 366th regiment in Stepanakert. In March 1992, the 366th regiment fell to pieces 
while the Armenian officers seized the light and heavy weapons and joined the Karabakh forces. The 
Economist, April 10, 1993.
10. Suzanne goldenberg, Pride of Small nations (London: Zen Books, 1994), pp. 119-120. 
11. Tokluoglu, “Definitions of National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnicity in post-Soviet Azer-
baijan in the 1990s,” pp. 725-727.
12. Robert V. Barylski, “The Caspian Oil Regime: Military Dimensions,” Caspian Crossroads, 
Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1995), http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepage/usazerb/casp.htm.
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Armenian victories over Azerbaijan’s forces. Elchibey’s major campaign promise was 
to defeat the Armenians in Karabakh and to unite Karabakh as part of Azerbaijani ter-
ritory. Elchibey initially achieved some military victories. He gave priority to develop-
ing a strategic partnership with Turkey, and considered radical solutions to overcome 
Azerbaijan’s security dilemma. He prioritized expanding contacts with the West as a 
key factor in strengthening national independence. Accordingly, Elchibey’s adminis-
tration set a pro-Western course for Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The country’s rich oil 
resources were an important policy instrument, as emphasized by the then-president of 
the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Sabit Bagirov: “The only 
way to accomplish improving Azerbaijan’s economic and political relations with the 
West was to resort to the ‘oil card’ and to offer the territory of Azerbaijan for the West’s 
new strategic routes to Central Asia.”13 
Likewise, Elchibey’s administration gave priority to the acceleration of negotia-
tions with Western oil companies.14 Elchibey made clear to all representatives of foreign 
oil companies that Azerbaijan’s new government was ready to sign mutually beneficial 
contracts. Rapidly following the statements of his government’s willingness to work with 
foreign companies, two contracts were signed, with Bp-Statoil in September 1992 and 
with pennzoil-Ramco in October 1992 for the Chirag and guneshli fields, respectively. 
One important immediate political outcome of these oil agreements was that they sup-
ported the pro-Western course in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in addition to the potential 
economic benefits they promised. The agreements also demonstrated to Russia that Elchi-
bey was determined to work with Western companies in his oil strategy. The American 
stake in the initial agreements was particularly important considering that Amoco had the 
largest interest, followed by Unocal.15 Russia was totally excluded from these contracts.
Azerbaijan’s government had been moving, so far, in solid steps in pursuit of its 
strategic goals of strengthening the economic and political independence of the coun-
try by signing various interim memoranda and agreements.16 However, by the winter 
of 1992-93, the Karabakh forces had launched a counterattack and had defeated the 
Azerbaijani Army, occupying new territories in the Azerbaijani region outside of the 
Karabakh enclave. The defeats of the Azerbaijani Army provoked another round of 
power struggles in Baku. A military leader, Surat Huseyinov, refused to obey Elchi-
bey’s orders. In June 1993, an anti-government insurgency in Azerbaijan began, which 
accused the government of responsibilty for the defeats against Armenian forces.17 In 
fact, diplomatic sources viewed Surat Huseyinov as a coup leader against president 
Elchibey.18 For example, the US State Department cautiously drew a distinction be-
13. Sabit Bagirov, “Azerbaijan’s Strategic Choice in the Caspian Region,” in gennady Chufrin, ed., 
The Security of the Caspian Sea region (London: Oxford University press, 2001), pp. 179-180.
14. Negotiations with Western firms had been started by the Ministry of Oil and gas in Moscow 
and Caspmorneftegaz of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and continued slowly during Mutalibov’s 
administration.
15. “Amoco Concludes Deal to Develop Oil Field in Azerbaijan Republic,” Eastern Europe re-
port, Vol. 1, No. 36 (October 7, 1991).
16. Bagirov, “Azerbaijan’s Strategic Choice,” p. 180.
17. “Azerbaijani Quits; Ex-Communist Steps In,” The new york Times, June 14, 1993, p. A6 and 
“prime Minister of Azerbaijan Quits,” Washington Post, June 8, 1993, p. A17.
18. Martin Sieff, “Azeri Seeks Censure of June Coup plotters,” Washington Times, August 12, 
1993, p. A9.
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tween Haydar Aliyev and the rebel leader Huseyinov.19
The timing of the Russian withdrawal from ganja and Huseyinov’s rebellion 
against president Elchibey clearly emphasized the conflicts in the Caucasus and the geo-
politics of Caspian oil. Despite the optimism that overtook Baku as major foreign capital 
was invested in Azerbaijan, the West was not prepared to directly support the Elchibey 
Administration against Russia. The Armenian community in the US effectively lobbied 
to gain American support for the Armenian position in the Karabakh conflict.20 In April 
1992, the US Congress passed the “Freedom Support Act” that determined the assistance 
to be given by the US to the former Soviet republics in their transition to democracy and 
to a market economy. However, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act restricted the 
US government’s assistance to Azerbaijan and became a major obstacle for Azerbaijan in 
seeking further American assistance in strengthening its economy and national security.
Following the insurgency of Huseyinov against president Elchibey, Haydar Ali-
yev returned to power.21 The Karabakh forces took further advantage of the chaos in 
Azerbaijan and occupied several districts adjacent to Karabakh. Several hundred thou-
sand Azerbaijanis had to flee their villages, creating a dramatic refugee problem. At the 
same time, the Talish minority in the southern town of Lenkoran started an upheaval. 
The Lezgin minority, inhabiting the North, was also tense, concerned about being in-
volved in turmoil.22 In the summer of 1993, Azerbaijan was in chaos and threatened to 
collapse into a multitude of regions fighting against the central authorities in Baku. The 
new president, Aliyev, succeeded in repressing the Talish rebellion and in asserting the 
central authority over various regions of Azerbaijan in a short time. 
president Aliyev’s foreign policy opted for closer relations with Russia. He vis-
ited Moscow and agreed to join the Commonwealth of Independent States in September 
1993. Aliyev also invited the Russian oil company Lukoil to join the oil projects in the 
Caspian offshore fields. Consequently, ten percent of SOCAR’s share of the Azeri, Chi-
rag, and guneshli offshore fields was transferred to Lukoil. president Aliyev’s strategic 
approach to Russia was to gain its support, particularly with regards to the Karabakh 
conflict.23 Aliyev’s approach to Russia bore some fruit,24 including the signing of the “deal 
19. Sieff, “Azeri Seeks Censure.”
20. F. Wallace Hays, “The US Congress and the Caspian,” Caspian Crossroads, Vol. 3, No. 3 
(Winter 1998), http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepage/usazerb/casp.htm.
21. Haydar Aliyev was the leading Azerbaijani Communist and the fourth-ranking leader in the 
Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era.
22. According to the last Soviet census in 1989, the Lezgin and Talish minorities constitute 2.4% 
and 0.3% of the total Azerbaijan population, respectively. According to the 1999 census of Azerbaijan, 
the Lezgin and Talish minorities constitute 2.2% and 1.0% of the total population, respectively. The 
Lezgin minority is the third largest minority group in Azerbaijan, following Russians (5.6% in 1989 
and 1.8% in 1999) and Armenians (5.6% in 1989 and 1.5% in 1999). The State Statistical Commit-
tee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, demoqrafik gostericiler [demographic Indicators], Ahalinin Milli 
Terkibi [Population by nationalities], http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/az/006.shtml#s7.
23. Nasib Nassibli, “Azerbaijan: Oil and politics in the Country’s Future,” in Michael p. Croissant 
and Bulent Aras, eds., oil and geopolitics in the Caspian Sea region (Westport, CT: praeger publi-
cations, 1999), pp. 104-107.
24. Cheterian, “Dialectics of Ethnic Conflicts and Oil projects in the Caucasus,” pp. 11-37, and 
Kamer Kasim, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caspian Oil and Regional powers,” in Bulent go-
kay, ed., The Politics of Caspian oil (New York: palgrave, 2001), pp. 185-198.
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of the century” that established the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) 
to develop the country’s offshore oil and gas fields.25 In November 1993, the Azerbaijani 
Army began a new offensive on the Karabakh front, but it did not achieve any progress, 
and a cease-fire was signed in May 1994. By the time of the cease-fire, Armenia had cap-
tured the Karabakh region and seven other districts forming a supply corridor between the 
region and Armenia, an area that accounted for 20% of Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory.
Aliyev’s long-term strategy was to bring in multiple countries’ investment in the 
oil and gas sector to strengthen national security. The investment of various companies 
from the US and Europe tried to catalyze the formation of an international pro-Azer-
baijani lobby to strengthen Azerbaijan’s position in the Minsk group, the diplomatic 
platform for negotiations on the Karabakh conflict.26 In an interview, Vafa gulizade, 
who was Aliyev’s foreign policy adviser, related the importance of oil as more than 
just a revenue producing commodity: “Oil is our strategy, it is our defense, and it is our 
independence. Iran is dreaming dreams of Azerbaijan, and if the Russians were strong, 
they would colonize Azerbaijan. But they can’t because Aliyev invited the whole world 
in to watch.”27 
A senior officer from the US Department of Energy emphasized Aliyev’s specific 
strategy as follows: “Azerbaijan’s strategy has been to bring in as many large com-
panies from different countries as possible. So this is why you see first Amoco, now 
Bp-Amoco, Bp, Exxon, Statoil, AgIp, just almost every major company. Almost every 
major company from major countries has a position in Azerbaijan. That was very pur-
poseful because Aliyev’s strategy was to try to gain as much support for Azerbaijan and 
its development plans from as many countries as possible. Not just the US.”28
Strengthening Azerbaijan’s independence and national security always has been 
at the core of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy despite some swings under four different 
presidents between 1992 and 2003. Its rich oil resources and relations with Western 
oil companies were an important policy instrument in achieving these foreign policy 
goals. 
legAl STATuS of The CASPiAn SeA: The ChAllenge for AzerbAijAn AgAinST ruSSiA
 
The dispute over the demarcation of the Caspian Sea was another important issue 
in setting the strategic goals for Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The conflict over the legal 
status of the Caspian and the ownership of its oil became an issue particularly after 
Azerbaijan signed its first oil contract in September 1994 under the presidency of Hay-
25. The Azerbaijani Army received large quantities of arms, including tanks and assault helicop-
ters, and more than 200 Russian military experts moved to ganja to reorganize the army. 
26. A subset of OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) members, referred 
to as the Minsk group after the location of its first convening, formed to supervise the negotiations 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Karabakh conflict in 1992. The group is jointly co-chaired 
by Russia, France, and the US.
27. Jeffrey goldberg, “getting Crude in Baku: The Crude Face of global Capitalism,” The new 
york Times Magazine, October 4, 1998.
28. Interview by the author with a senior US government officer in the Department of Energy, Of-
fice of policy Analysis, Trade and Investment for Europe, NIS and the Middle East, Washington DC, 
April 27, 2001.
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dar Aliyev. Russia and Iran, on one hand, have contended that the Caspian is actually 
an inland lake and thus subject to joint control by all the littoral states. Azerbaijan, on 
the other hand, has argued that the Caspian is a sea that should be divided into national 
sectors over which each state has exclusive sovereignty. The other two littoral states, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have supported Azerbaijan. 
Russia has argued that historic treaties with Iran in 1921 and 1940 imply that the 
sea cannot be divided.29 Although Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan did not sign these treaties, 
the Alma Ata Declaration of December 1991 that established the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States, and which was signed by all the former Soviet Republics, included a 
specific provision recognizing the validity of all treaties and agreements signed by the 
USSR. There was, therefore, a case for keeping the treaties between Russia and Iran in 
force. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan has claimed that the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea should be applied to the Caspian. 
By giving an important stake to Lukoil, Aliyev’s administration expected that 
Russia would take a softer stand about the dispute on the Caspian Sea’s legal status. 
After the signing ceremony of “the deal of the century” that established the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC) and included eight Western companies, a 
Saudi Arabian firm, and a Russian firm,30 Russian politicians and officials have issued 
public warnings that opening up the Caspian Sea to international oil and gas develop-
ments over which Russia had no control would not be officially recognized.31 However, 
despite the strong opposition of, and sometimes threatening statements made by the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia’s Fuel and Energy Minister backed Lu-
koil’s participation in the AIOC agreement and downplayed territorial disputes over 
the Caspian Sea.
Early production of the AIOC was important for Azerbaijan to stabilize its econ-
omy, promote internal stability by generating revenues from exporting oil, and secure 
its territorial integrity. Following the strong Russian stand against the unilateral oil 
contracts with Western oil companies to develop offshore fields in the Caspian Sea, 
Azerbaijan put all its diplomatic efforts into securing the rights to develop its national 
sector of the Caspian Sea. In November 1994, the littoral states established a Caspian 
coordinating committee to work on demarcation and related issues, including naviga-
tion and fishing rights. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan was all alone in the lack of direct and 
29. The Treaty of Turkmanchai (February 21, 1828) established that the land boundary between 
Russia and persia would end at the Caspian Sea, thus implying that the sea was not subject to de-
limitation at the time. Article 8 of the treaty also established freedom of navigation on the Caspian 
for merchant vessels of both sides, but reserved for Russia the sole right to deploy warships there. 
The Soviet-persian Treaty of Friendship (February 26, 1921) established freedom of navigation for 
all Soviet and persian ships on the Caspian. The Treaty on Trade and Navigation between the USSR 
and Iran (March 25, 1940) reiterated the freedom of navigation rights of the 1921 treaty. Moreover, 
a ten nautical mile offshore fishing zone was recognized. See Cynthia M. and Michael p. Croissant, 
“The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Conflict and Compromise,” in Croissant and Aras, eds., oil and 
geopolitics in the Caspian Sea region, pp. 21-42.
30. Amoco (US), Bp (UK), Statoil (Norway), the Turkish petroleum Corporation (TpAO, Turkey), 
pennzoil (US), Ramco (UK), Delta (Saudi Arabia), McDermott (US), Unocal (US), and Lukoil (Rus-
sia). Later on some of these companies sold their equity to other companies partially or fully.
31. “Kozyrev reinforces objections to Azerbaijan-Western Oil Deal,” radio free Europe, Septem-
ber 22, 1994.
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active involvement of Western governments, so that it had no option other than to play 
the oil card to leverage Russian pressure in its foreign policy.
Within this framework, when we look at Azerbaijan’s preferences in signing new 
oil contracts or considering different pipeline routes, we observe a reflection of certain 
strategic choices by the Azerbaijani government in building a Western-oriented foreign 
policy. Azerbaijan signed two further deals in 1995 in which the Russian oil firm Lukoil 
had a stake. However, Azerbaijan continued to face Russian opposition in the demar-
cation of the Caspian Sea. Thus, in November 1995, Aliyev further tried to appease 
Russia by giving it the biggest share in the development of the Karabakh oil field.32 
Later, in June 1996, the third major consortium, to develop the Shah Deniz field, was 
established, in which Iran was included.33 The Azerbaijani government had been delib-
erately giving concessions to the oil companies of its powerful neighbors like Russia 
and Iran to lessen the pressure coming from these countries regarding the demarcation 
of the Caspian Sea. Aliyev’s concessions also worked as a catalyst in forming a pro-
Azerbaijan lobby of powerful Russian oil and energy circles within the Russian gov-
ernment.34 Nevertheless, president Aliyev’s policy was to use relations with Western oil 
companies and the oil agreements to strengthen Azerbaijan’s Western-oriented foreign 
policy in achieving its strategic goals.
In subsequent years, Azerbaijan has consistently rejected Russia’s proposal on 
the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Aliyev’s success in resisting Russian pressure was 
due in large measure to the diplomatic support of the US35 on the issue.36 After pro-
claiming neutrality on the legal status of the Caspian Sea for more than two years, the 
US gave its support in favor of sectoral division in November 1996, because in the mid-
32. This included 45% to LukAgip, an Italian-Russian joint venture, and 12.5% to Lukoil. Other 
participants in the Caspian International petroleum Company to develop the Karabakh field were pen-
nzoil (30%, US), Agip (5%, Italy), and SOCAR (7.5%, Azerbaijan). “Azerbaijan production Sharing 
Agreements as of February 1999,” US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, http://www.usacc.org/
content.php?type=news&chi=13&par=12.
33. Iran 10%, Bp 25.5% (UK), Statoil 25.5% (Norway), Lukoil 10% (Russia), Elf 10% (France), 
TpAO 9% (Turkey), and SOCAR 10% (Azerbaijan).
34. Two contradictory policy groups contributed to Russia’s policy towards the Caucasus and 
Central Asia in the initial five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first group was led 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (both when Yevgeny primakov and Andrei Kozyrev were Foreign 
Ministers), which interpreted Russian policy within a traditional balance of power framework. They 
viewed the development and export of oil in zero-sum terms and took Russia’s historical hegemony 
more into consideration for its relations with the newly independent states. prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin and Oil Ministry officials formed the second group. They welcomed Western partici-
pation in the development of Caspian reserves as a means of accessing capital and technology and 
establishing a Russian foothold in world oil markets. Thus, they had more focus on adjusting to the 
realities of a free market. Consequently, inter-ministry contradictions in Russian policy towards the 
Caucasus and Central Asia seemed to be the result of power diffusion in the still emerging post-Soviet 
new order in Russia.
35. The US support came in the form of a note from president Bill Clinton conveyed by Special 
Ambassador to the NIS James Collins, stating the US government’s support of American investment 
companies and of the idea of sectoral division of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan was later given assur-
ances from US Vice president Al gore.
36. Jennifer DeLay, “Baku Knows What’s At Stake – Aliyev walks Fine Line on New Oil Deal,” 
Pipeline news, No. 42 (December 14-January 10, 1996) and Jennifer DeLay, “US Delegation Visits 
Baku for political, Economic Talks,” Pipeline news, No. 38 (November 16-22, 1996).
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1990s, American policy had been proceeding with two major issues: NATO expansion 
and encouraging Russian political and economic reform. Thus, the US government did 
not want to challenge Russian policy on the legal status of the Caspian Sea to balance 
the broader goals in American foreign policy in its relations with Russia.37 The US had 
opposed Russia’s idea of joint development of the Caspian Sea, particularly after the 
Iranian national oil company got a stake in the major Shah Deniz consortium. 
president Aliyev’s overall strategy regarding oil agreements was to resist Rus-
sian pressure by combining Azerbaijan’s national interests with the US government’s 
regional policy and the large volume of foreign investment by American and other 
Western oil firms. An expert US government officer clearly emphasized the strategy of 
Aliyev as follows:
In Azerbaijan Aliyev made a strategic decision that the future of his country will be 
the oil and the West. And the way to do that is to bring in Western oil companies 
and to create a balance between European and American companies. So he created 
a geopolitical safety net for Azerbaijan … The presidents try to use the national 
nature and national identity of the companies to balance their geopolitical interests, 
and to maximize their independence from Russia but not only from Russia. Similar-
ly they attract Europeans. But I think these leaders don’t really trust Europeans very 
much. They like having Americans because they think that it is important to have a 
strategic partnership with Americans … They wanted American companies, I think, 
because they thought that would bring the American government into the equation 
by orienting towards Europe and against Russia. I think Azerbaijan worried about a 
Russian reaction, a Russian backlash. So if you want to push Russia away you can’t 
rely on Europeans because they have a long record of cooperating with Russia [the 
interviewee was referring to World War I and to the beginning of World War II]. But 
probably they thought, ‘Oh, we have Americans to push the Russian backlash away. 
They perceive it that way.’38
The issue is no longer whether the seabed should be divided but how that division 
might be accomplished. All littoral states now favor sectoral division of the Caspian 
Sea. In May 2003, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia concluded bilateral agreements 
with each other based on a Russian-developed principle known as the “modified me-
dian line.”39 Consequently, Azerbaijan successfully utilized the large amount of invest-
ment by Western oil companies in achieving its foreign policy goals, as evidenced in 
the case of the demarcation of the Caspian Sea.
37. Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of oil in The Caucasus and Central Asia (New York: Oxford 
University press, Adelphi Paper No. 300, 1996), pp. 17-18; also see Jean-Christoph peuch, “private 
and National Interests in the Caspian Region,” in gokay, ed., The Politics of Caspian oil, pp. 173-
174.
38. Interview by the author with a US government official in the National Security Council, Wash-
ington, DC, April 26, 2001.
39. These three littoral states divided the northern 64% of the Caspian Sea into three unequal parts, 
giving Kazakhstan 27%, Russia 19%, and Azerbaijan 18%. US Department of Energy, “Country 
Analysis Briefs, Caspian Sea,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Background.html.
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AzerbAijAn’S foreign PoliCy And The ChAllengeS for energy SeCuriTy in The 
CASPiAn region
While the previous section outlined the importance of the oil-led development 
process and relations with multinational oil companies in setting Azerbaijan’s strategic 
goals and enforcing a Western-oriented foreign policy to cope with regional conflicts, 
this section examines the linkages between Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and the new 
challenges for energy security in the Caspian. Accordingly, it argues that the oil-led 
development process and geopolitics continue to prevail in the strategic goals of Azer-
baijan’s foreign policy, though within an emerging framework of energy security that 
extends beyond just the revitalized and understandably preeminent concern over se-
curing non-OpEC oil and alternative gas supplies to Russian gas exports, which is a 
particular concern for the European Union. 
The Azerbaijani government has relied on the support of the US government and 
Turkey to satisfy both the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline 
and the South Caspian gas pipeline as well as the geopolitical stability of the region 
in favor of Azerbaijan. Likewise, Azerbaijan’s leadership has exploited a number of 
issues in its favor, both in foreign policy and domestic politics, including: the geopo-
litical rivalry over pipeline routing; the strategic location of the region in the global 
fight against terrorism; the country’s neutral status in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear 
proliferation despite its strategic alliance with the US; and the distributive nature of its 
state-building practices based on the possession of hydrocarbon reserves. Neverthe-
less, the new energy security problematique entails looking not only at securing energy 
infrastructure and transnational pipelines, but also at the new challenges to foreign 
policy decision-making stemming from issues affecting human development, such as 
geopolitical rivalries, fluctuating oil prices due to recession in the world economy, and 
democratization. 
Accordingly, while the democratization process and economic and social devel-
opment in Azerbaijan constitute challenges in domestic politics, nuclear proliferation 
in Iran, the Karabakh conflict, and energy security in the Caspian region are the major 
issues for Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Since Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, the 
larger oil revenues and oil-led economic development have created a rentier state in-
stead of a market economy. Thus, the democratization process has been slow, as the po-
litical leadership in Azerbaijan distributes selective benefits to certain political and so-
cial groups in exchange for political acquiescence. The dependence of prominent state 
bureaucrats, regional administrators, and businessmen on the allocation of revenues 
and resources that are strictly controlled by president Ilham Aliyev (who succeeded his 
father Haydar Aliyev in 2003) and his extended network of loyal family/clan members 
further strengthens undemocratic governing institutions.40 president Aliyev does not 
depend on his constituents, because the Azerbaijan government does not need to ex-
tract resources from a domestic economy that lacks diversified sectors. The economy 
of Azerbaijan is heavily dependent on growth in the oil and gas sector, which accounts 
40. pinar Ipek, ”Azerbaijan: Oil Boom and Challenges,” in Mustafa Kibaroglu, ed., Turkey’s 
neighborhood (Ankara: Foreign policy Institute, 2008), pp. 129-131.
238 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
for nearly 90% of total exports.41 
Furthermore, although the completion of the BTC pipeline project was carried 
out successfully by Azerbaijan, Turkey, the US, and georgia despite changes in these 
countries’ governments, crucial issues such as endemic poverty or long-standing au-
thoritarian rule, coupled with nepotism and corruption in Azerbaijan and georgia, 
complicates the prospects for regional stability which was proven to be fragile in the 
aftermath of the war between Russia and georgia.42 Similarly, failure to fulfill domestic 
economic and political expectations may provoke instability in the region, given the oil 
price fluctuations in a recessed world economy. For example, closer scrutiny of key hu-
man development indicators for Azerbaijan highlights the economic vulnerability of a 
considerable part of the population living under the relevant poverty line, despite high 
economic growth rates or ample oil and gas export revenues.43 
Consequently, Azerbaijani foreign policy is at a crossroads, not only because of 
emerging threats stemming from the revitalized geopolitical rivalry between Russia 
and Caspian countries but also because of the new challenges in a broadened concept 
of energy security entailing issues related to human development and security. 
ConClUSIon
Foreign policy-making is influenced by numerous domestic and international fac-
tors. In Azerbaijan, a wide range of determinants should be assessed in terms of their 
influence on foreign policy. These include the nature of the regime in its post-Soviet 
state-building process; questions of national identity; the influence of domestic groups; 
Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography; the interests of neighboring powers; and the invest-
ment of multinational oil companies. Above all, state contingencies and Azerbaijan’s 
oil-led development process and its relations with multinational oil companies have 
driven foreign policy-making. The argument suggests that geopolitics has been impor-
tant in setting the strategic goals of Azerbaijan’s Western-oriented foreign policy, largely 
driven by the interplay between the oil-led development process and regional conflicts. 
Moreover, in comparison, for example, to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy,44 
the combination of security threats in the early years of Azerbaijan’s independence and 
the historical turning point known as “Black January,” which created pro-independence 
and anti-Russian feelings among Azeris and influenced its emerging national identity, 
were critical in setting a Western orientation in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. 
It is further argued that a new trans-Atlantic partnership is required to meet the 
41. The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan in figures 2007, 
http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2007/en.
42. pinar Ipek, ”Challenges for Democratization in Central Asia: What Can The United States 
Do?,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No.1 (Spring 2007), pp. 96-99.
43. The UN human development index (HDI) values for Azerbaijan in 2005 is 0.746 and ranked 
98, as medium human development. However, the proportion of the population living below the na-
tional poverty line between 1990-2006 was 49.6%. Similarly, the population living below $4 a day 
(1990 ppp$) in the 2000-2004 period was 85.9% in Azerbaijan. United Nations Development pro-
gram, Human development report 2007-08, Country Tables, http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries.
44. pinar Ipek, “The Role of Oil and gas in Kazakhstan’s Foreign policy: Looking East or West?,” 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7 (2007), pp. 1179-1199.
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challenges and to manage the risk entailed in the unpredictable policy environments 
of the Caspian region within a broadened energy security framework. In the midst of 
a tight and volatile global oil market despite the slowdown in world economy, other 
salient events and trends, such as the war in Iraq, dramatic growth in China and India’s 
energy imports and foreign direct investments, the growing consolidation of Russia’s 
position as a major supplier of European Union gas, and the crisis over Iran’s nuclear 
program, have renewed awareness of energy security. Accordingly, pipelines bypassing 
Russia and transporting alternative oil and gas resources from the Caspian region are 
important to diversify, secure, and stabilize world energy markets. However, obtaining 
particular alternative gas supplies for Europe requires not only a common external Eu-
ropean Union energy policy but also potentially a trans-Atlantic partnership in energy 
security to protect critical infrastructure from terrorist threats and to improve upon low 
levels of human security that pose associated security risks in geopolitical rivalries and 
regional stability. 
Likewise, to the extent that earnings from export activity can be directed to rais-
ing economic welfare and stimulating further reform in the democratization process, 
projects like Nabucco, which in its present form intends to pipe gas from Azerbaijan’s 
offshore Shah Deniz field via Baku and Tbilisi, georgia into Turkey’s national gas 
pipeline grid and then onwards to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria’s gas trad-
ing hub, may provide an important infrastructural pillar for poverty reduction and pre-
serving peace and stability in the Caspian countries.45 Specifically, Turkey may serve 
an increasingly important role as a hub for diversifying and securing the transportation 
of pipeline gas from Caspian and Middle East countries (such as Iraq and Iran) to the 
EU as well as for the export of LNg (from Ceyhan on the Mediterranean) deriving 
from these same source regions.46 However, there has been a starker divergence in 
the energy policies of the EU members, which impedes the formation of a common 
EU external energy policy as well as a potential trans-Atlantic partnership to promote 
the wider concept of energy security.47 Thus, the emerging challenges for Azerbaijan’s 
foreign policy and the fragile stability in the Caspian region should be reconsidered 
through the nexus of power politics surrounding energy security, the EU’s common ex-
ternal energy policy, and the leading role of large American and British oil companies 
in the Caspian region that requires a new trans-Atlantic partnership to enforce not only 
stability but also human security. 
45. The pipeline, with a projected capacity of 31 billion cubic meters per year by the year 2011, 
has political backing from the European Commission. 
46. The overcrowded energy transport traffic in the persian gulf, particularly in the Strait of Hor-
muz, does not allow the safe and efficient transportation of potential additional LNg exports from 
Iraq and Iran. Iran currently lacks an LNg terminal.
47. pinar Ipek and paul A. Williams, “Divergence in EU Member-State Energy policies: A chal-
lenge to the EU’s Common Energy policy and a Trans-Atlantic partnership in Human Security,” paper 
presented at the german Marshall Fund of the United States policy Research Conference on Energy 
Security, Trento, Italy, April 18-19, 2008.
